Fundamental Legal Concepts: A Formal and Teleological Characterisation

this paper by Giovanni Sartor introduces a set of fundamental legal concepts, a broad characterisation of their logical structure, and their role in legal reasoning.

The work is an overview of basic normative concepts, based on the following ideas: first of all, that it is useful to go beyond the usual ideas of obligation and permission, and provide legal reasoning with a larger set of normative positions. Secondly, that it is possible to provide a coherent and integrated account of the different normative modalities. Thirdly, that this account cannot be fully grounded on the ideas of obligation and permission. A different set of foundations is required for the notion of power, which needs to be connected to legal dynamics, as grounded on conditionality.

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